ABSTRACT With the increasing use of mobile devices, a secure communication and key exchange become the significant security issues in mobile environments. However, because of open network environments, mobile user can be vulnerable to various attacks. Therefore, the numerous authentication and key exchange schemes have been proposed to provide the secure communication and key exchange. Recently, Qi and Chen proposed an efficient two-party authentication key exchange protocol for mobile environments in order to overcome the security weaknesses of the previous authentication and key exchange schemes. However, we demonstrate that Qi and Chen's scheme is vulnerable to various attacks such as impersonation, offline password guessing, password change, and privileged insider attacks. We also show that Qi and Chen's scheme does not provide anonymity, efficient password change mechanism, and secure mutual authentication. In this paper, to overcome the outlined abovementioned security vulnerabilities, we propose a secure and efficient two-party authentication key exchange protocol, called 2PAKEP, that hides user's real identity from an adversary using a secret parameter. 2PAKEP also withstands various attacks, guarantees anonymity, and provides efficient password change mechanism and secure mutual authentication. In addition, we prove that 2PAKEP provides the secure mutual authentication using the broadly accepted Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic and the session key security using the formal security analysis under the widely accepted real-or-random model. Moreover, the formal security verification using the popular simulated software tool, Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications, on 2PAKEP shows that the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks are protected. In addition, we also analyze the performance and security and functionality properties of 2PAKEP and compare these with the related existing schemes. Overall, 2PAKEP provides better security and functionality features, and also the communication and computational overheads are comparable with the related schemes. Therefore, 2PAKEP is applicable to mobile environment efficiently.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices along with the information and communication technology (ICT) have advanced to such an extent that mobile users can freely utilize various services such as roaming, file sharing, smart healthcare, mobile banking, shopping, and payment on the go. These mobile services are convenient and improve the overall welfare of users. However, due to an open network property, an adversary could intercept, modify, replay, delete or eavesdrop the transmitted information, and then an adversary could try to obtain sensitive user data by various attacks such as replay, masquerading, impersonation and password guessing attack. Therefore, to ensure the privacy of mobile users, secure two-party authentication and key exchange has become a very important security issue.
For the last few decades, several password based authentication key exchange protocols [1] - [6] and smart card based authentication key exchange protocols [6] - [13] , [20] - [24] have been proposed to provide privacy of the mobile users. In 2009, Yang and Chang [10] proposed an ID-based authentication scheme with smart card using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). However, Yoon and Yoo [19] found that Yang and Chang's scheme cannot prevent impersonation attack and it cannot also provide perfect forward secrecy. To overcome these security weaknesses, they proposed an enhanced authentication scheme. In 2012, He et al. [11] claimed that Yoon and Yoo's scheme still cannot provide perfect forward secrecy, and they then proposed an enhanced ID-based client authentication with key agreement protocol. However, in 2013, Chou et al. [12] showed that He et al. ' s scheme has flaw of private key verification process. In 2015, Yang et al. [13] demonstrated that He et al.'s scheme cannot resist impersonation and unknown key share attack, and then Yang et al. proposed an improved two-party authentication key exchange protocol.
To overcome security weaknesses of above mentioned schemes, recently in 2017, Qi and Chen [25] proposed an efficient two-party authentication key exchange protocol for mobile environments using ECC. Qi and Chen [25] also showed that their proposed scheme can resist various attacks including man-in-the-middle, stolen verifier and replay attacks. They also claimed that their scheme can provide perfect forward secrecy, session key security, mutual authentication and anonymity. However, we demonstrate that Qi et al's scheme cannot prevent impersonation, password change, privileged-insider and offline password guessing attacks. We also show that their scheme does not provide the anonymity, secure mutual authentication, secure key agreement and efficient password change mechanism. Subsequently, we propose a secure and efficient two-party authentication key exchange protocol to solve these security vulnerabilities.
A. THREAT MODEL
For the security analysis in this paper, we present the Dolev-Yao (DY) threat model [14] , which is generally used for analysis of the security of a cryptographic protocol. The assumptions of the threat model are as follows.
• Firstly, under the DY model an adversary can eavesdrop, modify, replay or delete the messages transmitted over a public channel.
• Secondly, an adversary can obtain a lost or stolen mobile device, and can then extract all the stored information in the mobile device or smart card [15] , [16] .
• Finally, an adversary can be a legitimate user of the system (privileged-insider) or an outsider, and that he/she can perform various attacks using obtained information [17] , [18] .
B. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
The contributions of this paper are listed below.
• We point out the security weaknesses of Qi and Chen's scheme and demonstrate that it is vulnerable to various attacks such as impersonation, password change, offline password guessing and privileged-insider attacks. We also show that Qi and Chen's scheme cannot achieve secure mutual authentication, secure key agreement, efficient password change mechanism and anonymity.
• To overcome the security weaknesses of Qi and Chen's scheme, we propose a provably secure and efficient two-party authentication key exchange protocol for mobile environments. 2PAKEP prevents impersonation, password change and offline password guessing attack, and also provides secure mutual authentication, key agreement, perfect forward secrecy, session key security, efficient password change mechanism and anonymity.
• 2PAKEP has an efficient password change mechanism because mobile users can change passwords freely without the server assistance.
• We prove that 2PAKEP provides secure mutual authentication and session key security using the BAN logic [26] and formal security analysis under the ROR model, respectively. 2PAKEP is also informally (non-mathematically) analyzed to prove its security against other potential attacks. We then analyze the performance of 2PAKEP and other related existing schemes.
• The formal security verification of 2PAKEP is also done through the simulation study using the broadly-accepted AVISPA tool.
C. PAPER OUTLINE
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we review the authenticated key exchange scheme of Qi and Chen [25] .
In Section III, we analyze of the security weaknesses of Qi and Chen's scheme. In Section IV, to overcome security weaknesses of Qi and Chen's scheme, we propose a provably secure and efficient two-party authentication key exchange protocol for mobile environment. In Sections V and VI, we discuss the security of 2PAKEP. We compare the performance of 2PAKEP with the related existing schemes in Section VII. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. REVIEW OF QI AND CHEN'S SCHEME
In this section, we review the Qi and Chen's two-party authentication key exchange protocol for mobile environment. Their scheme consists of four phases: 1) system initialization, 2) user registration, 3) mutual authentication and key exchange, and 4) password change activity. The notations used in this paper are listed in Table 1 .
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION PHASE
Before the user registration phase, the server S has to perform system initialization phase. The system initialization process is as follows:
Step 1: S sets an elliptic curve E/F p and chooses a base point P with an order n over E/F p , where n is a large prime number. Step 2: S chooses a long-term private key d S from Z * n and computes a public key Q S = d S P.
Step 3: Finally, S selects collision-resistant one-way hash functions H 1 (·) and H 2 (·), and then S publishes the system parameters {E/F p , P, n, Q S , H 1 (·), H 2 (·)}.
B. USER REGISTRATION PHASE
If a new mobile user U wants to use various mobile services, U has to register his/her identity with the server S. The user registration phase is shown in Figure 1 and the detailed steps are as follows:
User registration phase of the Qi and Chen's scheme.
Step 1: U submits his/her identity ID u and password PW u through a secure channel (e.g., in person).
Step 2: After receiving {ID u , PW u }, S computes H 2 (ID u ), and then checks whether ID u and H 2 (ID u ) exist in its database. If these exist, S asks the U for a new identity.
Step 3: S computes the parameter l = H 1 (d S ) ⊕H 2 (ID u ||PW u ) and delivers it to U through secure channel.
Step 4: Finally, U stores the secure parameter l into his/her smart card or mobile device.
C. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND KEY EXCHANGE PHASE
When a mobile user U wants to access mobile services, U requires to send an authenticated key exchange request to server S. Qi and Chen's mutual authenticated key exchange phase is given in Figure 2 and also its detailed steps are as follows:
FIGURE 2. Mutual authentication key exchange phase of the Qi and Chen's scheme.
Step 1: U inputs the identity ID u and password PW u , and then chooses a random number = Auth us . If the condition is satisfied, S and U achieve the mutual authentication and session key agreement successfully.
D. PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE
When a mobile user U wants to change his/her password, he/she should change his/her password freely. The password change activity is shown in Figure 3 and the detailed steps of this phase are as follows: Step 1: U inputs the identity ID u and old password PW u and new password PW new . U then chooses a random number r u ∈ Z * p . After that U computes
) and sends the password change request message {Auth u , CID u , R u } to S via public channel.
Step 2: After receiving 
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF QI AND CHEN'S SCHEME
In this section, we analyze the security weaknesses of Qi and Chen's scheme. Qi and Chen [ [25] claimed that their scheme is robust against various attacks, and can provide perfect forward secrecy, session key security, mutual authentication and anonymity. However, we demonstrate that Qi and Chen's scheme cannot resist the following attacks.
A. USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
According to Section I-A, we assume that an authorized user of the system can be an adversary U a who intercepts the transmitted messages in the previous session. Next, U a obtains the parameter
, where l is the parameter stored in smart card or mobile device, and ID a and PW a are the identity and password of U a , respectively. Finally, U a performs the user impersonation attack using the following steps:
Step 1: 
B. PASSWORD CHANGE ATTACK
The password change process of Qi and Chen's scheme is similar to the mutual authentication and key exchange phase. If an adversary U a has obtained the identity of the user ID u , U a can change the U 's password freely. The result of this attack shows that Qi and Chen's scheme cannot resist password change attack.
C. OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
We assume that an adversary U a has stolen or obtained the smart card or mobile device of a legal registered user U , and then attempts to guess the correct password of U using the following steps: 
. Hence, the user U 's real identity ID u is revealed to A, and as a result, Qi and Chen's scheme does not preserve the user anonymity property.
E. SECURE MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND SESSION KEY AGREEMENT
According to Section III-A, an adversary can impersonate a legitimate user successfully. Therefore, Qi and Chen's scheme cannot provide secure mutual authentication and session key agreement.
F. PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
During the user registration phase, a registered user U submits his/her chosen identity ID u and password PW u to the server S. Thus, a privileged-insider user of the S being an insider attacker knows ID u and PW u directly.
Therefore, if U uses the same PW u for other applications, the privileged-insider attacker can utilized this password to obtain other services for which the user U is eligible. Hence, it is clear that Qi and Chen's scheme also fails to maintain the privileged-insider attack.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present our provably secure and efficient two-party authenticated key exchange protocol (2PAKEP) for mobile environment that overcomes the security weaknesses of Qi and Chen's scheme discussed in Section III. 2PAKEP also consists of four phases as in the Qi and Chen's scheme, namely 1) system initialization, 2) user registration, 3) mutual authentication and key exchange, and 4) password change. It is worth noticing that the system initialization phase of 2PAKEP remains same as that for Qi and Chen's scheme.
To achieve replay attack protection and freshness, we apply the current system timestamps in 2PAKEP. For this issue, it is assumed that all the network participants (users and server) are synchronized in their respective clocks. This practical assumption has been widely applied in many authentication protocols that are recently proposed in [27] - [33] .
A. USER REGISTRATION PHASE
If a mobile user U wants to access various services from the server S, U must register with S. The user registration phase of 2PAKEP is executed in a secure channel (for example, in person) that is shown in Figure 4 , and the detailed steps are as follows: Step 1: U picks his/her identity ID u and password PW u .
After that, U generates two random numbers a u and b u , and computes
Then, U submits ID u and the masked password (RPW ⊕ b u ) to the S through a secure channel.
Step 2: After receiving {ID u , RPW ⊕ b u }, S calculates H 2 (ID u ), and then checks whether ID u and H 2 (ID u ) exist in its own database. If they exist, S asks U to register with another new identity.
Step 3: S proceeds to calculate the parameter
with ID u in its database and delivers the parameter l to U through a secure channel.
Step 4:
, and stores the secret credentials l , v and C in his/her smart card or mobile device.
B. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND KEY EXCHANGE PHASE
When a registered mobile user U wants to access the services from the server S, U needs to send a mutual authentication key exchange request message to the S. The mutual authentication key exchange phase is briefed in Figure 5 and the detailed steps are as follows:
Step 1: U inputs identity ID u and password PW u either using smart card or mobile device, and calculates
= C u . If they are equal, U picks a random number r u ∈ Z * p and generates the current timestamp T u , and computes R u = r u P, R = r u Q S , CID u
Step 2: After receiving Msg 1 , S validates the received timestamp T u by the verification condition |T * u − T u | < T , where T is the maximum transmission delay and T * u is the reception time of the message Msg 1 
and retrieves the real identity ID u of U in its own database corresponding to the computed At the end, both S and U store the same session key SK (= SK ) for their secure communications.
C. PASSWORD CHANGE ACTIVITY
In 2PAKEP, a mobile user U can change his/her password freely without further involving the server S. The password change activity has the following steps:
Step 1: U first inputs identity ID u and old password PW u through the smart card or mobile device.
Step 2: The smart card (mobile device) computes RPW = H 2 (ID u ||PW u ), a u = v⊕ RPW and C = H 2 (ID u ||PW u ||a u ), and then checks if C = C is satisfied.
If it is valid, it asks U to enter his/her chosen new password.
Step 3: U chooses a new password PW new and inputs it to the smart card or mobile device.
Step 4: The smart card (mobile device) continues to calcu-
v new and C new in her/her smart card (mobile device), respectively. Our password change activity phase is summarized in Figure 6 . 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The broadly-accepted formal methods (i.e., random oracle model) cannot capture some structural mistakes, and as a result, ensuring the soundness of authentication protocols is still an open problem [31] . Hence, it is also necessary for the security analysis informally (non-mathematical) to assure that an authentication scheme becomes secure against various known attacks with high probability. To achieve this purpose, in this section, we perform the formal security analysis using the widely-accepted Real-Or-Random (ROR) model [40] and then mutual authentication proof using the broadly-accepted BAN logic [26] for 2PAKEP. Apart from these, we also perform the informal security analysis in order to verify the security of 2PAKEP so that the scheme will be secure with high probability. Moreover, we simulate 2PAKEP for formal security verification using the widely-used AVISPA tool [34] in Section VI.
A. FORMAL SECURITY USING ROR MODEL
This section proves 2PAKEP's session key security using the ROR model.
1) ROR MODEL
The authentication and key exchange phase of 2PAKEP involves two participants, namely, U and S. The main components related to the ROR model in 2PAKEP are briefly discussed below.
a: PARTICIPANTS
Let I t U and I s S be the instances t and s of U and S, respectively that are known as the oracles.
b: ACCEPTED STATE
If an instance I t is in an accept state after receiving the final protocol message, it will be in accepted state. The ordered concatenation of all communications (send and received messages by I t ) forms the session identification (sid) of I t for the present session.
c: PARTNERING
Two instances I t and I s are the partners to each other once the following three criterion are satisfies concurrently: 1) I t and I s are in accepted state, 2) I t and I s mutually authenticate each other and share the same sid, and 3) I t and I s are mutual partners of each other.
d: FRESHNESS
If the established session key SK between U and S is not known through a reveal query Reveal defined below, I t U or I s S will be called fresh.
e: ADVERSARY
An adversary A is modeled using the widely-accepted Dolev-Yao (DY) model as discussed in our defined threat model (Section I-A). Hence, A can intercept, delete, modify, or even inject the messages exchanged between the involved participants U and S during the communication using the following accessed queries:
The eavesdropping attack is modeled under this query that permits A to intercept (read) the messages exchanged among U and S.
Send(I t , Msg): Under this query A transmits a message Msg to a participant instance I t , and it also receives the response message from I t . It is modeled as an active attack.
Reveal(I t ): This query reveals the session key SK created by I t (and its partner) to A in the present session.
CMD/CSC(I t U ):
Under this corrupt mobile device or corrupt smart card query, A can extract all the sensitive secret credentials stored in it. This is modeled as an active attack.
Test(I t ): Under this query, an unbiased coin c is flipped prior to beginning of the game. Depending on the output, the following decision is taken. A executes this query and if the session key SK between U and S is fresh, I t returns SK in case c = 1 or a random number in case c = 0; otherwise, it will return a null value (⊥).
In our formal security analysis, a restriction is imposed on A to access a limited number of CMD/CSC(I t U ) queries, while A is permitted to access an unlimited number of Test(I t ) queries.
f: SEMANTIC SECURITY
The indistinguishability of the actual session key SK from a random number by A is essential under the semantic security. The output of Test(I t ) is examined for consistency against the random bit c. If A's guessed bit is c and Succ denotes the winning probability in the game, a polynomial t time adversary A's advantage in breaking the session key (SK) security of 2PAKEP is denoted and defined by Adv 2PAKEP (t) = |2.Pr[Succ] − 1|, where Pr[·] denotes the probability.
g: RANDOM ORACLE
2PAKEP applies the public one-way cryptographic hash function h(·). We model h(·) as a random oracle, say Hash.
Before proving the SK-security of 2PAKEP, we define the following computational problems. A collision-resistant one-way hash function h(·) is formally given below [41] .
Definition 1 (Collision-Resistant One-Way Hash Function):
A collision-resistant one-way hash function h: {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n is a deterministic function which inputs a variable length data and outputs a fixed length value, say n bits. If Adv HASH (A) (rt) is an adversary A's advantage in finding a hash collision, we have,
where the pair (i 1 , i 2 ) ∈ R A indicates that the inputs i 1 and i 2 are randomly chosen by A. An (η, rt)-adversary A attacking the h(·)'s collision resistance means that Adv HASH (A) (rt) ≤ η and the runtime of A is at most rt.
Let E/F p be an elliptic curve over a finite field F p and P ∈ E p (a, b) be a base point. The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)): Given P and Q ∈ E/F p , to find the discrete logarithm d, where Q = dP and dP is known as the elliptic curve point (scalar) multiplication, that is, dP = P+P+· · ·+ P (d times).
The elliptic curve decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (ECDDHP) is a computational hard problem in ECC which is defined as follows. Proof: We follow the proof of this theorem as done in [31] and [33] . A sequence of five games, say G j for j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 is needed. Succ G j denotes the probability associated with the game G j in which an adversary A can win the game G j and the advantage of A in winning the game G j is denoted and defined by Adv G j = Pr[Succ G j ]. Each game G j is described as follows.
• Game G 0 : This is the starting game in which A selects the bit c. It is worth noticing that G 0 and the real protocol in the ROR model are identical to each other. Hence, we have,
• Game G 1 : This game implements the eavesdropping attack by A. Under this game, A uses Execute query, and once the game is completed, A makes the Test query. The output of the Test query is used to decide whether A gets the actual session key SK or a random number. In 2PAKEP, SK is calculated by both U and
Here, SK u = r u R S = r u (r S P) = r S (r u P) = SK S . In order to derive SK (= SK ), A requires both temporal secrets r u and r S , and also the permanent secret ID u . Hence, A's winning the G 1 is not increased by this eavesdropping attack. It is also worth noticing that both the games G 0 and G 1 are indistinguishable. Therefore, it follows that
• Game G 2 : GM 2 : This game simulates the Send and Hash queries. This game is modeled as an active attack wherein A intercepts all the messages Msg 1 = {Auth u , CID u , R u , T u }, Msg 2 = {Auth S , R S , T S } and Msg 3 = {Auth us , T u }. Since all these messages involve the random nonces and current timestamps, there will be no collision in hash outputs when A makes the Hash queries (see Definition 1). Using the results from the birthday paradox, we obtain the following:
• Game G 3 : This game implements the CMD/CSC query wherein A can extract all the credentials l , v and C from the lost or stolen device or smart card of U , where
To derive or guess the password PW u and identity ID u of a registered user U from l , v and C is computationally infeasible problem due to unknown secret credentials a u and d S using the Send queries. Since the games G 2 and G 3 are identical when the password guessing attack is not involved, it follows that
• Game G 4 : This is the final game which is modeled as an active attack. To derive the session key SK = kdf (ID u
A can use all the intercepted messages Msg 1 , Msg 2 and Msg 3 , and then try to derive SK u = r u R S = r u (r S P) = r S (r u P) = SK S . A can derive SK u = r u R S with the intercepted R S or can derive SK S = r S R u with the intercepted R u . However, this problem is essentially same as solving the ECDDHP (see Definition 3). Therefore, we have the following result:
Since all the games are executed, it only remains for A to guess the correct bit c. It then follows that
(1) and (2) lead to the following result:
(6) and (7) also lead to the following result:
Using the triangular inequality, we have the following result:
From (8) and (9), we have,
(t). (10)
Final step is to multiply (10) on both sides by a factor of 2. After this step, rearranging the terms the required result is obtained:
B. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION PROOF USING BAN LOGIC
To prove that 2PAKEP achieves mutual authentication, we perform the BAN logic [26] analysis. First, we introduce the notations of the BAN logic in Table 2 and then define its logical postulates. Finally, we show that 2PAKEP provides mutual authentication among the user U and the server S. 
1) LOGICAL POSTULATES OF BAN LOGIC
The logical postulates (rules) of the BAN logic are described below.
(Message meaning)
A ≡ A K ↔ B, A {C} K A |≡ B | ∼ C
(Nonce verification)
To conduct the BAN logic analysis, we first define the verification goals and idealized form of 2PAKEP. Then, we present our assumptions and demonstrate that 2PAKEP provides secure mutual authentication between U and S.
2) GOALS
The following goals are needed in 2PAKEP to prove that secure mutual authentication between U and S is achieved:
The idealized forms of the transmitted messages Msg 1 = {Auth u , CID u , R u , T u }, Msg 2 = {Auth S , R S , T S } and Msg 3 = {Auth us , T u } can be expressed as given below:
4) ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are taken into consideration:
5) PROOF USING BAN LOGIC
To achieve the above goals, we have the following steps:
Step 1: In accordance with Msg 1 , we can get:
Step 2: From S 1 and A 1 , we apply the message meaning rule to get:
Step 3: In accordance with A 2 , we apply the freshness rule to obtain:
Step 4: From S 2 and S 3 , we apply the nonce verification rule to obtain:
Step 5: In accordance with Msg 2 , we can get:
Step 6: From S 5 and A 3 , we apply the message meaning rule to obtain:
Step 7: In accordance with A 4 , we apply the freshness rule to obtain:
Step 8: From S 6 and S 7 , we apply the nonce verification rule to get:
Step 9: In accordance with Msg 3 , we can get:
Step 10: From S 5 and A 5 , we apply the message meaning rule to obtain:
Step 11: In accordance with A 6 , we apply the freshness rule to obtain:
Step 12: From to S 10 and S 11 , we apply the nonce verification rule to get:
Step 
C. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS
This section conducts the informal (non-mathematical) security analysis of 2PAKEP to demonstrate that it is secure against various other well-known attacks such as impersonation, password change, replay, privileged insider, and offline password guessing attacks. We also show that it ensures anonymity and mutual authentication.
1) IMPERSONATION ATTACK
For an adversary U a trying to impersonate a legitimate user U , U a has to know the precise real identity and password of U . According to Section III-A, if U a obtains the hash value H 1 (d S ) using the parameter l, U a cannot obtain the user's real identity
In other words, U a cannot generate a valid login request message successfully without obtaining legitimate ID u and PW u . Therefore, 2PAKEP prevents impersonation attack.
2) PASSWORD CHANGE ATTACK
In the password change activity of 2PAKEP, we suppose that an adversary U a tries to change the password of a legitimate user U . To change the password of U , U a requires to computes C = H 2 (ID u ||PW u ||a u ) correctly because the smart card checks whether C is correct in the password change process with the stored C. However, because U a cannot know ID u , PW u and a u , U a cannot change the password of U . For this reason, 2PAKEP resists password change attack.
3) OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
We assume that an adversary U a could get the user's smart card and intercept previous transmitted messages. However, the parameters including password such as RPW , v, c and l are hashed with other values. In addition, to guess the password correctly, U a must know ID u and a u exactly. Therefore, due to collision-resistant property of the hash function (see Definition 1), 2PAKEP also prevents offline password guessing attack.
4) REPLAY ATTACK
If an adversary can try to reuse the transmitted messages in 2PAKEP, he/she cannot reuse messages because the transmitted messages include timestamps T . In addition, user U and server S verify the received timestamp T by the condition |T * − T | < T , where the reception time of the message is T * . Therefore, 2PAKEP resists replay attack
5) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
Suppose an adversary U a intercepts the login request message Msg 1 = {Auth u , CID u , R u , T u } and aims to modify this message to make another valid message, say Msg 1 = {Auth a , CID u , R a , T a } by generating fresh random number r a ∈ Z * p and generates the current timestamp T a . Then, U a can compute R a = r a P and R = r a Q S . However, U a cannot compute Auth a = H 2 (ID u ||R ||CID u ||T a ). In a similar argument, U a cannot also modify other messages Msg 2 = {Auth S , R S , T S } and Msg 3 = {Auth us , T u }. It is then clear that 2PAKEP resists man-in-the-middle attack.
6) PRIVILEGED INSIDER ATTACK
In the privileged insider attack, a privileged insider user of the trusted system being an attacker tries to obtain other user's information in registration phase. This attack is considered as a critical security attack [27] - [29] . We suppose that an adversary U a is a privileged insider of the S and becomes an insider attacker. In the registration phase of 2PAKEP, the user U computes H 2 (ID u ||PW u ) ⊕ b u and sends it along with ID u to the server S. In other words, U a cannot know the real password PW u of the user U because RPW ⊕ b u is hashed by a one-way hash function and is combined with b u . Moreover, we also assume that after the registration process is completed, U a has the lost/stolen smart card or mobile device, and extracts all the sensitive information l , v and C stored in its memory, where
Without knowing the secret credentials d S and a u , it is computationally infeasible to guess the correct password PW u of the user U from l and v. In addition, guessing the correct password PW u of the user U from C = H 2 (ID u ||PW u ||a u ) is computationally infeasible without knowing the secret credential a u . Therefore, 2PAKEP is robust to the privileged-insider attack.
7) ANONYMITY
If an adversary U a could obtain a user's smart card and intercept previous transmitted messages, U a cannot get the user's real identity ID u . In the mutual authentication & key exchange phase of 2PAKEP, U sends the pseudo-identity CID u = l ⊕ RPW to the S. However, U a cannot obtain the real identity ID u of U because U a cannot know the server's long-term private key d S . In addition, S retrieves the real identity of U from the database using H 2 (d S ||ID u ). Therefore, 2PAKEP provides user anonymity property.
8) SECURE MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND SESSION KEY AGREEMENT
According to Section V-C.1, an adversary cannot generate the valid messages successfully during the authentication and key exchange phase. In addition, using the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) R u = r u P and R S = r S P are computed, U and S check the correctness of the conditions Auth S = H 2 (ID u ||R * ||SK S ) and Auth us = H 2 (R||SK u ), respectively. Thus, 2PAKEP ensures secure mutual authentication and session key agreement.
9) EFFICIENT PASSWORD CHANGE MECHANISM
In Qi and Chen's scheme, when a mobile user U wants to change the password, he/she has to send password change request message to the server S. In other words, the computation and communication cost of this phase are similar to mutual authentication & key exchange phase in their scheme. However, in 2PAKEP, when a mobile user U wants to change the password, he/she can change the password PW u freely without the server's assistance. First, U inserts the smart card, and then inputs the valid ID u , PW u and PW new . Next, the smart card verifies the identity and password, and computes the parameters. Finally, because the smart card has already checked whether ID u and PW u are correct, the smart card changes the password successfully without any mistakes. VOLUME 6, 2018 Therefore, the password change mechanism of 2PAKEP is more efficient than Qi and Chen's scheme, and it is achieved locally without involving the server S.
VI. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION USING AVISPA TOOL: SIMULATION STUDY
This section evaluates the formal security verification of 2PAKEP using the popularly-accepted Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool [34] . AVISPA-based formal security verification has been attracted recently and is used in many authentication protocols to check whether a security protocol is resilient against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks [27] - [29] , [31] - [33] .
AVISPA has four back-ends: 1) On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC), 2) Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), 3) SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) and 4) Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP). More detailed descriptions on these back-ends can be found in [34] . The security protocols need to be specified in HLPSL (High Level Protocols Specification Language) of AVISPA [35] . HLPSL is a role based language and contains the following roles [34] , [35] :
• The basic roles denote the participating entities in the protocol.
• The composition roles denote the different scenarios involving basic roles. In HLPSL, an intruder represented by i plays a legitimate role. The HLPSL specification of the protocol is converted to its intermediate format (IF) using the HLPSL2IF translator. After that the IF is converted to output format (OF) by feeding it to one of the four back-ends. The various sections of the OF are discussed in [35] .
A. HLPSL SPECIFICATION OF 2PAKEP
2PAKEP has been implemented in HLPSL for the user registration as well as authentication and key exchange phases. The HLPSL specification for the role of the user U is provided in Figure 7 . During the user registration phase, the user U , being the initiator, first receives the start signal and then generates two random numbers a u and b u , computes RPW and sends the registration request message {ID u , (RPW ⊕ b u )} to the server S through a secure channel. After that U gets the registration reply message {l} from the S through a secure channel.
During the mutual authentication and key exchange phase, the user U generates random number r u and current timestamp T u , computes R u , R, CID u and Auth u , and then sends the login request message Msg 1 = {Auth u , CID u , R u , T u } to the S via open channel. After that U receives the authentication request message Msg 2 = {Auth S , R S , T S } from the responder S via open channel. Finally, U sends the authentication reply message Msg 3 = {Auth us , T u } to the S through public channel by generating current timestamp T u . In Figure 7 , the declarations secret({IDu}, sp1, {U,S}), secret({PWu}, sp2, {U}) and secret({Ds}, sp3, {S}) indicate that the information ID u is shared between both U and S, password PW u is only known to U and the private key d S is known to S, respectively. Here, sp1, sp2 and sp3 are the protocol ids. The declarations witness(U, S, u_s_ru, Ru'), witness(U, S, u_s_tu, Tu') and witness(U, S, u_s_tu, Tu1') tell that U has freshly generated the random number r u , timestamps T u and T u for S, respectively and these are maintained by the protocol ids u_s_ru, u_s_tu and u_s_tu1, respectively. Other declarations request(S, U, s_u_rs, Rs') and request(S, U, s_u_ts, Ts') mean that U 's acceptance of r s and T s generated for U by S, respectively. In a similar way, the role for the server S is implemented and shown in Figure 8 . Figure 9 shows the definitions for necessary roles -session, goal and environment. In the session segment, all the basic roles: user and server are instanced with concrete arguments. The top-level role (environment) specifies in the specification of HLPSL, which contains the global constants and a composition of one or more sessions, where the intruder (i) plays some roles as legitimate users. The intruder also participates in the execution of protocol as a concrete session. The current version of HLPSL supports the standard authentication and secrecy goals. In our implementation, three secrecy goals and five authentications are checked as shown in Figure 9 . 
B. ANALYSIS OF SIMULATION RESULTS
2PAKEP is simulated using the widely-used OFMC and CL-AtSe backends under the SPAN, the Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA tool [36] . 2PAKEP makes use of the bitwise XOR operations. Since SATMC and TA4SP backends do not implement XOR operations at present, the simulation results of 2PAKEP under these backends become as ''inconclusive,'' and due to this reason, the simulation results under SATMC and TA4SP backends have been ignored in this paper.
The following three verifications are essential for 2PAKEP:
• Executability checking on non-trivial HLPSL specifications
• Replay attack checking • Dolev-Yao model checking The executability check is essential to ensure that the protocol can reach to a state where a possible attack can happen, during the run of the protocol. From Figures 7 and 8 , it is shown that 2PAKEP is properly translated to HLPSL specification and it meets the design goals by ensuring the executability. 2PAKEP is simulated for the execution tests and a bounded number of sessions model checking. For replay attack checking, both OFMC and CL-AtSe backends verify if the legal agents can execute the specified protocol by performing a search of a passive intruder. Moreover, both OFMC and CL-AtSe backends verify the occurrence of any man-in-the-middle attack possible by i for the Dolev-Yao model checking.
The simulation results for both OFMC and CL-AtSe backends are reported in Figure 10 . The OFMC backend takes 0.1 seconds search time, while it visits 36 nodes with a depth of 4 plies, whereas CL-AtSe backend analyzes 4 states and it takes 0.13 seconds translation time, and all 4 states are reachable. Therefore, all verifications, such as executability checking on non-trivial HLPSL specifications, replay attack checking and Dolev-Yao model checking are fulfilled in 2PAKEP. As a result, 2PAKEP becomes safe against both replay & man-in-the-middle attacks.
VII. PERFORMANCE COMPARATIVE STUDY
This section compares the performance of our proposed scheme (2PAKEP) with other related schemes [11] , [13] , [25] .
A. COMPARISON OF SECURITY AND FUNCTIONALITY FEATURES
Various security and functionality features of 2PAKEP are compared with other related schemes in Table 3 . From this table, it is evident that the existing schemes are vulnerable to various attacks. In addition, the existing schemes cannot provide mutual authentication, anonymity and also efficient password change mechanism. Therefore, 2PAKEP provides better security and functionality features as compared to those for the other related schemes [11] , [13] , [25] . 
B. COMPARISON OF COMPUTATION OVERHEADS
We compare the computation overheads of different schemes in practical environment. We use the existing experimental results as reported in He et al.'s scheme [11] . All the cryptographic operations were implemented with a standard cryptographic library, known as MIRACLE [37] . The platform was a PIV 3-GHZ processor with 512-MB memory with Windows XP operation system. We use the following notations for analysis of computation overheads among different schemes:
• T h : time taken for a cryptographic hash operation • T XOR : time needed for an bitwise XOR operation • T ECC : time taken for an elliptic curve point multiplication operation
• T MAC : time required for a message authentication code (MAC) operation
• T inv : time taken for a modular inversion operation • T kdf : time needed for a key derivation function The execution times for different cryptographic operations are shown in Table 4 . Since the bitwise XOR operation is negligible, we have ignored this operation from our comparative study on computation overheads. It is also assumed that T kdf ≈ T h . [11] .
In Table 5 , we compare the computation overheads of 2PAKEP with other related schemes [11] , [13] , [25] during the authentication phase based on the experimental results shown in Table 4 . 2PAKEP needs 6T h + 2T XOR + 3T ECC + 1T kdf ≈ 36.247 ms for the user U side and 4T h + 3T XOR + 3T ECC +1T kdf ≈ 2.4905 ms for the server S side. The computation overheads for other schemes for the user and server sides are also shown in Table 5 . The results reported in Table 5 clear indicate that 2PAKEP is comparable with other schemes in terms of computation overheads. Though the computation overhead required for Yang et al.'s scheme [13] is less than that for 2PAKEP, Yang et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to various attacks and also it does not support other functionality features (see Table 3 ).
C. COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION OVERHEADS
Finally, we compare the communication overheads of 2PAKEP with other related schemes in Table 6 during the authentication phase. For this purpose, we assume that an identity is 160 bits, the hash output (message digest) using the SHA-1 hashing algorithm [38] is 160 bits, a random number (nonce) is 160 bits, timestamp is 32 bits and an elliptic curve point P = (P x , P y ) requires (160 + 160) = 320 bits assuming that an 160-bit ECC provides the same bit-security level of an 1024-bit RSA [39] ; P x and P y are the x and y co-ordinates of P, respectively. It is also worth noticing that the communication overhead required for 2PAKEP is comparable to that for other schemes [11] , [13] , [25] .
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we demonstrated that Qi and Chen's scheme is vulnerable to various attacks such as impersonation, password change, offline password guessing and privileged insider attacks, and it cannot also provide anonymity and mutual authentication. To resolve these security weaknesses, we propose a secure and efficient two-party authentication key exchange protocol for mobile environment. 2PAKEP prevents various attacks because it is hiding user's real identity from an adversary using secret parameters. In addition, 2PAKEP guarantees anonymity, secure mutual authentication and efficient password change mechanism. We also proved that 2PAKEP provides secure mutual authentication between U and S using BAN logic and the session key security using ROR model through formal security analysis. 2PAKEP is secure through the formal security verification using the widely-used AVISPA simulated tool. Furthermore, we analyze the performance comparison with other related schemes and it is shown that 2PAKEP performs well in terms of security and functionality features requirements, and its performance in terms of communication and computation overheads are also comparable with other related schemes.
As a result, 2PAKEP can be applicable to mobile environment efficiently. 
